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the 1947—60 period,6 the question arises as to whether such action is in
response to an expected (or recognized) turning point or for some other
purpose (i.e., "disorderly markets," balance of payments problems, etc.).
The Committee's minutes are the best source of this information. A
reading of these minutes shows that a modification of the previous find-
ings is in order. The minutes yield additional information about the
Committee's ability to recognize cyclical turns and, in combination with
its actions, yield additional insight into decisions concerning monetary
policy.
Chapter 2 describes the method used to evaluate the Committee's
forecasts. Chapter 3 reviews chronologically the FOMC's view of eco-
nomic conditions in the vicinity of the seven postwar turns covered by
its minutes and compares its ability to recognize peaks and troughs
with that of the business analysts studied by Fels. Chapter 4 relates the
Committee's forecasts and views of current economic conditions to the
policy decisions which it made during the periods surrounding cyclical




In his study of the problem of forecasting and recognizing business
cycle peaks and troughs, Fels found "there is a pattern in reports on
the business outlook in the vicinity of cyclical peaks and troughs. As
time goes by, analysts become increasingly aware of first the possibility,
then the probability, and finally the certainty of a turning point."
BBrunnerand Meltzer recorded eighty-seven changes in policy during the
years 1947—60. See their An Alternative Approach to the Monetary Mechanism,
Subcommittee on Domestic Finance, House of Representatives, 88th Congress,
2d Sess., Washington, 1964, pp. 119—124.
RendigsFels, "The Recognition Patterns of Business Analysts," the companion
piece in this volume. Fels studied the forecasts of ten publications made in the
vicinity of the eight turning points since World War U. Only eight of the publi-64 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
That is, recognition of a cyclical turn does not suddenly occur after a
discrete lag. Rather, there is a pattern of recognition beginning with
the first vague indications of awareness of the possibility of a turn. As
new information becomes available, more or less confidence is shown
that a peak or trough is approaching (or has passed) and eventually, if
the turn occurs, the forecaster becomes certain.
How does the FOMC's views of economic conditions in the vicinity
of cyclical turns compare with those of other forecasters? Does policy
responsibility influence the Committee's outlook? To answer these ques-
tions systematically, statements indicative of the members' views have
been excerpted from the Committee's minutes for the period 1947—60.
Beginning three months before the NBER reference cycle date and end-
ing six months afterwards, these quotations were scored using the
system developed by Fels.8
1. The Scoring System
The scores can range from zero to 100 per cent in 5 per cent increments,
and are assigned on the following basis. The Committee members always
have some opinion about the likeithood of a peak or trough that can be
expressed in the form of a percentage, though the percentages are usually
implicit. Each score assigned represents the scorers' estimate of the likeli-
hood implicit in the Committee's discussions of a cyclical turn within
a three-month target interval centered on the NBER business cycle date.
The three-month target interval is used as a time dimension restriction
on the forecast. The longer the time period to which a forecast refers,
the more confident a forecaster would be that a peak or trough would
occur. If the time period were sufficiently long, one would expect a
cyclical turn with 100 per cent confidence. Each assigned score repre-
sents the scorers' answer to the question: "What is the probability of a
cations were available for the entire period. The use of his findings in this study
is restricted to those eight (four business publications, two security services, and
two bank letters), and to seven of the eight turns. The February 1961 turn is
omitted here because at the time the study was completed the FOMC Minutes
hadbeen published only through 1960.
8AlthoughFels used two kinds of scores, one for timing and one for degree
of certainty, only the scoring procedure for certainty is used in this study. The
Committee's comments on timing of cyclical turns were so few that an adequate
comparison between the scores at various turns and between the Committee and
the business forecasters could not be made.Procedure 65
cyclical turn within plus or minus one month of the NBER business
cycle date implicit in this forecast?" A score of zero is assigned to a
forecast implying virtual certainty (less than 2.5 per cent chance) that
no turn will (did) occur within the target interval.
Following the procedure used by Fels, the "normal chance" of a peak
within any three-month period is assumed to be 10 per cent; of a
trough, 15 per cent. These percentages are rough approximations based
on the historical averages of peacetime expansions (two to three years)
and contractions (about one and one-half years). Since forecasters are
virtually always aware of some possibility of a turn, the "normal chance"
score is assigned (10 per cent in the vicinity of peaks, 15 per cent in the
vicinity of troughs) unless the Committee's discussion implies that the
chances are greater or less than "normal." If the Committee's discussion
of economic conditions indicates a greater than "normal chance" of a
cyclical turn within the three-month interval centered on the NBER
business cycle date, a higher score is assigned—up to the maximum of
100 per cent. A score of 100 per cent implies virtual certainty (likeli-
hood greater than 97.5 per cent) that a turn did (will) occur within
the target interval. Since the scores are subjective evaluations of the
Committee's discussions, they are limited to multiples of five(i.e.,
there are twenty-one possible scores). No finer gradation is justified.
To indicate better the nature of the scoring procedure, a few quota-
tions from the minutes and the score which would be assigned to each
are in order.
The following statements would be given the "normal chance" score
for peaks and troughs, respectively:
Almost all recent data continue to reflect rapid economic growth. Even
with a steel strike of relatively long duration, the present momentum of
economic recovery will almost certainly continue to carry the economy
higher..(Score—1Oper cent.)
Recent statistical data confirm the continued business decline, and there
is no sign yet of any combination of favorable factors sufficiently strong
to reverse this trend.1° (Score—15 per cent.)
A score of 50 per cent, which implies that the forecaster believes
that a turn within the target interval is as likely as not, would be as-
signed to the following statements:
°Minutes,July 28,1959, p.509.
10Ibid.,March 4,1958, p.176.66 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
Whether this is a period of formation of forces for further uptrend or for
some downward readjustment can not yet be cleaily read from current
business indicators."
I believe that a generally sidewise movement of the economy is more
likely during the next few months than a pronounced and cumulative move-
ment either up or down.12
The economy is in a more or less neutral and uncertain area between
expansion and recession.18
A score of 100 per cent implies that the forecaster was certain that
a peak or trough had occurred. The following comments by members
of the FOMC would receive that score:
Data becoming available made it clear that a vigorous economic recovery
was now visible and tangible.'4 (Score with respect to preceding trough—
100 per cent.)
In recent reports to the Committee, I have used the words "downsettling"
to characterize the drift in over-all activity. In the light of recent informa-
tion, general economic recession now appears to be the most appropriate
(Score with respect to preceding peak—100 per cent.)
The unfolding data are abundantly clear. They show vigorous revival—
one of the more robust on record following one of history's shorter and
milder contraction periods.'6 (Score with respect to preceding trough—
100 per cent.)
Although as many as twenty different views may be expressed at any
one meeting, only one score is assigned. The Committee is considered
to be a single forecaster. To determine how well a single score for the
entire Committee reflected the opinions of the members, the author
scored each individual's forecast separately in the vicinity of the 1960
peak. The individual scores for each meeting were then averaged; this
mean score represents the degree of certainty for the Committee as a
whole for that meeting. After a lapse of time sufficient to forget the
previously determined scores the author assigned one score per meeting
to the entire Committee as a single forecaster. For each meeting, the
average score for all forecasts and the single score for the Committee
as a whole were compared.
The two patterns of certainty scores were quite similar until five and
Li ibid., August 25, 1953, p. 318.
12 Ibid., September 22, 1954, pp. 277—78.
September 13, 1960,pp. 706—708.
December28, 1954, p. 395.
ibid., December 12, 1957, p. 770.
16 ibid., August 19, 1958, p. 692.Procedure 67
six months after the turn (see Appendix II, Table C), at which time
the score for the Committee as a whole became substantially larger
than the mean score of the individual forecasts. This divergence in the
patterns may be attributed to the author's intuitive weighting of the
forecasts of those members who analyzed the outlook in detail and
stated precisely what they viewed the situation to be. In making policy
decisions, those whose views are not yet crystalized may be strongly
influenced by members who are positive. A single score for the whole
Committee permits intuitive weighting of the views expressed and gives
a clear, though subjective, picture of the Committee's outlook. In addi-
tion,itis not clear that an unweighted average of individual scores
would be appropriate. Since everyone (seven Governors, twelve Presi-
dents, and several staff members) attending the meeting may express
an opinion but only the twelve members can vote, should all forecasts
be treated equally? If not, how should the relative weights be assigned?
Any weighted average score would involve as much subjectivity as a
single score for the Committee as a whole.17 Consequently, for the re-
maining months only one score for each meeting was assigned.
When there were two or more meetings in a month, the scores for
each meeting were consolidated into a single score for the month.
When there was no meeting in a given month, the score was derived
by interpolation. This procedure facilitated comparisons of the FOMC's
recognition patterns for different turns and comparisons of its patterns
with those of the eight business analysts studied by Fels.
As a check on the author's interpretation of the Committee's fore-
casts, John Pilgrim, a graduate student, independently scored the ex-
cerpted quotes using the same procedure. We then compared scores. If
a simple average of the two scores did not seem representative of either
person's interpretation of the minutes, we discussed the forecasts and
reached a consensus score, which is the score used in this study.'8
17 Pragmatically, the time required to score each person's comments individually
for aU seven turns would have been prohibitive, but it was done for the 1960
peak to gauge how much difference the procedure used makes in the recognition
pattern.
3.8 The original sets of independent scores are available upon request. In general,
the patterns revealed by the independent scores were similar, and no important
conclusion would be altered by the use of either of the original sets of scores
rather than the consensus score. More than a third of the independent scores
were identical, and nearly all the rest differed by 5pointsor less. Pilgrim's scores
were higher than the author's more often than not.68 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
Although the scoring method glosses over differences in opinion among
the individual members of the Committee and changes in the Com-
mittee's view in meetings within the same month, we believe the result-
ing certainty scores are sufficiently indicative of the Committee's views
on past, current, and future economic conditions to justify the conclu-
sions based on them.
From this pattern of certainty scores two, values have been selected
as being of particular use in assessing the Committee's ability to discern
cyclical turns—the 50 per cent score and the 90 per cent score. The
period between a turn and the first score of more than 50 per cent for
the Committee's forecasts is defined as the recognition lag. Notice that
this definition of "recognition" is independent of any policy decision
which the Committee may have made and, therefore, is not comparable
to "recognition" as defined in either of the previous studies. A score of
50 implies that the FOMC believes that a turn within the target interval
(the NBER business cycle date plus or minus one month) is as likely
as not. It does not imply or depend upon any "policy action," but is
based on the Committee's new view of economic conditions.
The period between a turn and a score of 90 per cent, which implies
a great degree of certainty that a turn has occurred, is defined as the
confirmation lag.1°
2. Standard of Comparison
An appropriate way to evaluate the ability of the FOMC to recognize
and confirm cyclical turns is to compare its performance with that of
other forecasters. The forecasting performances of the eight business
analysts studied by Fels serve as a basis for this evaluation.
Beginning three months before the NBER business cycle date of a
19AppendixII, Table C, which compares unweighted average scores of indi-
vidual's comments with the single scores for the Committee, raises a question
concerning this criterion. Since at five and six months after the peak the single
scores for the FOMC are substantially higher than the unweighted average scores,
is the 90 per cent criterion large enough to warrant the conclusion that the
Committee "confirmed" the occurrence of a turn? A 95 per cent criterion would
affect the "confirmation" lag at only one turn—the 1960 peak. But a 100 per
cent standard would extend the confirmation lag at all peaks, except 1957, beyond
the six-month period; the lag at the troughs of 1954 and 1958 would be in-
creased by one month each, and the lag at the 1949 trough would be increased
by two months (see Appendix II, Table A). Given the subjective nature of the
scoring procedure, the author felt that a certainty score of 90 per cent indicated
a sufficiently high degree of confidence to justify its use as the criterion for
"confirmation."Procedure 69
turn and ending six months after the turn, the Committee's certainty
scores are compared with those of the eight business publications. These
ten scores reflect the varying estimates of the forecasters' ability to
recognize the occurrence of the turn as it is approached and passed.
Two comparisons are made: the first compares the Committee's cer-
tainty scores with the average scores of the eight business forecasters;
the second compares the Committee's recognition pattern with that of
the "best" forecaster of the eight. The "best" forecaster is the publica-
tion with the highest mean certainty score for all postwar turns and is
the same publication selected by Fels as his "best" forecaster. Its per-
formance in recognizing troughs primarily accounts for its high over-all
certainty score. The publication had the highest mean certainty score at
each of the four troughs, but its performance was only the fourth best
of the eight forecasters in recognizing peaks. Moreover, its position at
peaks would be lower but for its exceptional performance at one peak,
1953. Hence in terms of consistency of performance the "best" fore-
caster is by no means the best, and indeed it strongly suggests an op-
timistic bias.
To check the consistency of the forecasters' performances, each of
the eight publications in Fels' sample was ranked according to its per-
formance at each of the eight turns. For all eight turns, for troughs only
and for peaks only, the coefficient of concordance (which measures the
degree of consistency among the rankings) is significantly different from
zero at the five per cent confidence level.20 Hence there is some evi-
dence of consistency in the forecasters' performance, but the results for
peaks and troughs separately may imply merely that some forecasters
have an optimistic and others a pessimistic bias, while the results for
peaks and troughs together may be attributed as much to forecasts that
are consistently poor as to forecasts that are consistently good. Since
the forecaster with the best over-all average record also has a highly
variable and apparently biased performance, comparisons of the Com-
mittee's record with that of the "best" forecaster must be heavily quali-
fied.
3. False Alarms
In order to check for false alarms—the "recognition" of turns which
did not occur—and to obtain an estimate of the significance of scores
20SeeAppendix I, Table I for more detail.70 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
prior to the actual turns, the Committee's views for all other months
within the January 1947—December 1960 period were scored (see Ap-
pendix II, Table B). To do so, the target interval was redefined as a
twelve-month period centered on the date of the Committee meeting.
That is, the score assigned was the scorer's estimate of the likelihood
of a cyclical turn implicit in the statements of the Committee members
sometime within the past or future six-month period.
During the period studied, the FOMC twice almost "recognized" a
peak which did not occur. Through the second half of 1951 and the
first half of 1952, the Committee characterized the economic situation
as one of approximate balance at high levels of activity. This was, in-
deed, the case. From the first quarter of 1951 until the fall of 1952,
the economy moved along on a gently rising plateau. With rising ex-
penditures on defense offsetting the declines in demand in the private
sector, GNP, in constant dollars, increased only $0.9 billion from 195 1-
III to In June 1951, the Committee adopted a "policy of
neutrality"—continued restraint but not contraction of bank credit—
and maintained it through 1952. During the first half of 1952, doubts
about the future direction of activity were most evident. The certainty
score reached a high of 40 per cent in February and averaged about
30 per cent for the six-month period (see Appendix II, Table B).
Again in 1956 the Committee evidenced considerable concern about
future business conditions. In fact, GNP in constant dollars changed
little—falling from $446.4 in 1955-IV to $443.6 in 1956-I, and from
$445.6 in 1956-Il to $444.5 in 1956-Ill. The Committee fluctuated
between optimism and pessimism as to the rate of economic activity
during 1956, but at no time did it foresee the probability of deflationary
forces gaining sufficient strength to carry the economy into a recession.
At the beginning of the year, the Committee expressed concern about
the continued vigor of the expansion. No downturn was envisioned but
such phrases as "the bloom is off the boom," "some steam has gone
out of the engine," and "ruts in the road" were sprinkled throughout
their discussion of the outlook. By March the Committee's view of the
situation had shifted toward the probability of the resumption of the
expansion, but it reverted to a concern about deflationary tendencies
at the May meeting, although it viewed the situation as one of activity
21Romannumerals are used to denote specific quarters of the year(e.g.,
1952-11 is second quarter of 1952).Procedure 71
on a "high plateau." After the settlement of the steel strike in July, the
Committee's concern about deflationary tendencies lessened, but during
the last quarter of the year it again became somewhat pessimistic. The
general view of the meetings for the rest of the year was that the
economy was on a high plateau, perhaps slightly rising, but that the
pace of advance was slackening and that soft spots were beginning to
appear. (See Appendix II, Table B for scores during 1956.)
4. The Beginning of Recognition
Since the certainty score at three months prior to a cyclical turn was
arbitrarily selected by Fels as the usual beginning of a pattern of in-
creasing recognition, some measure of its validity is needed. To de-
termine the beginning month of the FOMC's recognition pattern, we
assumed the following rules: (1) In the initial month the score assigned
must be at least 15 for peaks and 20 for troughs. That is, the score
must exceed the "normal chance" score. (2) There must be no decline
in the score, except when the lower score is at least double the "normal
chance" score (i.e., at peaks, the lower score must be at least 20; at
troughs, the lower score must be at least 30).
Table 11-1 shows the initial month of the recognition pattern and
TABLE lI-I









November 1948 October 1948 1
July 1953 December 1952 7
July 1957 October 1956 9
May 1960 February 1960 3
Troughs
October 1949 September 1949 1
August 1954 April 11954 4
April 1958 February 1958 2
SOURCE: Basedon data inAppendix II, Table B. See text for method of identifying
the beginning date.72 Recognition Pattern of the FOMC
the number of months before the NBER date of the turn by which the
Committee was judged to have begun recognizing an approaching turn,
In three cases the pattern began more than three months before the
turn, but for only two (1953 and 1957) did it begin substantially before
that time. In each of these cases, the year previous to the peak year had
been a period in which the Committee exhibited considerable concern
about the possibility of a turn (see the above discussion of "false alarms").
As a rule of thumb, three months prior to a turn seems to be a reasonable
date for the beginning of recognition, and comparisons of the FOMC's





To give the reader more insight into, the forecasting ability of the
Committee than is provided by the certainty scores alone, this section
describes its recognition pattern for each of the seven postwar turns
covered in this study and compares its performance in recognizing and
confirming these with the performances of the forecasters in Fels' sample
of eight.
When policy actions are referred to, the author adopted the language
of the Committee in characterizing them. For example, the "policy of
neutrality" is the Committee's terminology, not the author's. Conse-
quently, the references to "easy," "tight," "neutral," etc., money policies
do not necessarily represent the author's opinion as to what monetary
policy was being pursued, but represent the Committee's intentions as
indicated in its minutes. Such references are merely descriptive and, as
noted above, the scoring of the FOMC's forecasts is independent of the
actions taken.